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Abstract 
The paper presents a new decision rule which may be applied for mixed strategy searching under uncertainty, which means that 
the decision maker (DM) is able to prepare a payoffs’ matrix with possible alternatives and scenarios, but he does not know the 
probability of the occurrence of particular states of nature. The advantage of the new method, called the β-decision rule for mixed 
strategies, is the fact that it takes into account the DM’s coefficient of optimism on the basis of which a set of the most probable 
events is suggested and an optimization model is formulated and solved. 
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1. Introduction 
In the paper we will try to figure out an optimization model allowing the decision maker to find, under 
uncertainty, a mixed strategy considering his or her level of optimism. 
We will assume that the uncertainty occurs when one is not able to anticipate the future effectively. One may 
just forecast various phenomena and events, but it is difficult to estimate the exact value of particular parameters 
(company profit, demand for a product, product prices etc.). Then, the decision maker (DM) has to choose the 
appropriate alternative (decision, action, strategy, project) on the basis of some scenarios (states of nature, events) 
predicted by experts, him- or herself, but the DM does not know the probability of these scenarios. If the likelihoods 
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were known one would make the decisions under risk, DMUR – decision making under risk, not under uncertainty, 
DMUU – decision making under uncertainty (Groenewald & Pretorius, 2011; Render, Stair, & Hanna, 2006; 
Chronopoulos, Reyck, & Siddiqui, 2011; Officer & Anderson, 1968; Sikora, 2008; Trzaskalik, 2008).  
(Knight, 1921) first introduced the idea to apply risk and uncertainty in economics, but these two categories were 
formally integrated in economic theory by (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).   
Let us also add that we will even focus on cases for which the probability distribution aforementioned exists, but 
the crucial fact is that the decision maker does not know it or is not willing to use those available data. (Williams, 
Smith, & Young, 1997) and (Courtney, Kirkland, & Viquerie, 1997) call such a type of uncertainty – the subjective 
uncertainty (in contrast to certainty where the future results are known, objective uncertainty where parameters are 
presented by means of random variables with a given probability distribution, or ignorance which implies the lack 
of information concerning scenarios and possible values of parameters considered).  
On the other hand, (Teczke, 1996) names it strategic uncertainty (in contradiction to probabilistic uncertainty, 
within which the probability distribution is known, and stochastic uncertainty where the likelihood can be calculated 
on the basis of a sample).       
Hence, the result of the choice made by the decision maker under uncertainty depends on two factors: which 
decision (or which combination of decisions) will be selected and which scenario (state of nature) will occur in the 
future.  
The DMUU may be presented with the aid of a profits’ matrix or payoffs’ matrix (Table 1) where m is the 
number of mutually exclusive scenarios (let us denote them by S1, S2, …, Sm), n signifies the number of decisions 
(D1, D2, …, Dn) and aij is the profit connected with the scenario Si and the alternative Dj. We will assume that 
outcomes in the matrix are monetary payoffs. 
Table 1. Payoffs’ matrix / decision table (general case) 
Scenarios and decisions D1 Dj Dn 
S1 a11 a1j a1n 
Si ai1 aij ain 
Sm am1 amj amn 
There exist many decision rules applied within the decision making under uncertainty (e.g. Wald, 1950; 
Hurwicz, 1951; Hurwicz, 1952; Savage, 1961; Basili, 2006; Basili & Zappia, 2010; Basili, Chateauneuf, & Fontini, 
2008; Gilboa, 2009; Ghirardato, Maccheroni, & Marinacci, 2004; Ellsberg, 2001; Etner, Jeleva, & Tallon, 2012; 
Gaspars-Wieloch, 2013a; Gaspars-Wieloch, 2013b; Marinacci, 2002; Nakamura, 1986). Some of them are dedicated 
to optimal pure strategy’s searching, other are designed for optimal mixed strategy’s searching.  
When we talk about pure strategies, the decision maker chooses and completely executes only one alternative. 
On the other side, a mixed strategy (mixed acts, mixed actions) implies that the decision maker selects and performs 
a weighted combination of several accessible alternatives, see e.g. bonds portfolio construction, cultivation of 
different plants (Officer & Anderson, 1968). This paper will concern the second case. 
Existing decision rules for mixed strategies rather relate to the game theory, i.e. game between players 
(Czerwiński, 1969; Gilboa, 2009; Luce & Raiffa, 1957), than the game against nature (which constitutes a neutral 
opponent). Nevertheless one may find in the literature several approaches for the last situation.  
Depending on the DM’s target, it is possible to formulate and solve, among other things, the max-min problem 
(Wald’s problem) or the Bayes’ problem which allow to establish an optimal mixed strategy (see e.g. Puppe & 
Schlag, 2009; Sikora, 2008). The first rule is designed for radical pessimists intending to perform the selected 
solution only once. The second rule assumes that the DM is going to execute the recommended plan many times.  
In this paper a new decision rule is presented. Its final aim consists in finding a suitable mixed strategy for a DM 
who is interested in a single execution of the chosen strategy and who is not a radical pessimist, but is rather 
moderate or even optimist and knows his level of optimism.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the Wald’s and Bayes’ rules for mixed 
strategies are briefly described. Section 3 presents the new decision rule. Section 4 contains an illustration of the 
suggested approach. Conclusions are gathered in Section 5.  
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2. The Wald’s and Bayes’ decision rules for mixed strategies 
The Wald’s rule assumes that since the DM intends to perform the mixed strategy only once, it is reasonable to 
behave cautiously and to maximize the minimal benefit. Therefore, the optimization model corresponding to such an 
approach has the following structure (Officer & Anderson, 1968): 
max→y   (1) 
yxa
n
j
jij ≥∑                            mi ,...,1=   (2) 
1=∑
n
j
jx
 (3) 
0≥jx                                   nj ,...,1=  (4) 
where y is the minimum guaranteed revenue, n denotes the number of decisions, aij is the payoff connected with the 
state Si and the decision Dj, xj signifies the share of the alternative Dj in the mixed strategy and m is still the number 
of scenarios. 
The solution of such a model ensures that even if the least attractive scenario takes place, the income of the 
decision maker will not be lower than y* which denotes the maximized minimum guaranteed revenue. 
The Bayes’ rule, as it was mentioned above, assumes that the DM will perform the selected plan many times. 
That is why, in such circumstances it seems to be logical to maximize the average income. Hence, the optimization 
model emerges in the following form: 
max
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                     nj ,...,1=   (8) 
where n denotes the number of decisions, ja  is the average payoff for the alternative Dj, xj signifies the share of the 
alternative Dj in the mixed strategy, aij is the payoff connected with the state Si and the decision Dj and m is the 
number of scenarios. 
As one may observe, the maximized average income (a*) is at least as high as the maximized minimum 
guaranteed revenue (y*).  
Obviously, from the DM’s point of view, the most desirable situation would occur if such a state of nature Si 
took place and such an alternative Dj was chosen, for which the payoff aij fulfills the Equation (9), compare with the 
max-max rule for pure strategies (Trzaskalik, 2008) and see Equation (10). 
*}{max
,...,1
,...,1
Maa ij
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ij ==
=
=
   (9) 
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*** yaM ≥≥  (10) 
The decision maker may introduce some additional constraints to the models (e.g. the share of the strategy D1 in 
the mixed strategy may not exceed the share of the strategy D2). In these circumstances the maximized minimum 
guaranteed revenue and the maximized average income are usually lower than y* and a* computed by means of 
Equations (1)–(4) and (5)–(8) respectively. Such supplementary conditions also unable to obtain the level M*.  
3. The β-decision rule for mixed strategies 
Now, let us check how we can formulate the optimization model when the decision maker intends to perform the 
mixed strategy only once but reckons on a higher income than y* (the maximized minimum guaranteed income) and 
is able to estimate his or her coefficient of optimism (β) which satisfies, of course, the condition (11): 
]1,0[∈β  (11) 
One possible approach may consist in applying the concept of the Hurwicz’s rule (Hurwicz, 1951; Hurwicz, 
1952) which was originally proposed for pure strategy searching.  
The model could then emerge in the following form: 
max
1
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  (13) 
0≥jx                                                nj ,...,1=   (14) 
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i
ij
i
j aah min1max ⋅−+⋅= ββ                      nj ,...,1=  (15) 
where hj is the Hurwicz’s index of the decision Dj.  
However, it is worth emphasizing that the Hurwicz’s rule takes into consideration only extreme payoffs 
connected with a given alternative, not the frequency of occurrence of the intermediate ones (see Gaspars-Wieloch, 
2012; Gaspars-Wieloch, 2013a; Gaspars-Wieloch, 2014), which may lead to quite illogical recommendations. 
Additionally, the Hurwicz’s rule uses the information about the DM’s risk aversion to predict the maximum and 
the minimum payoffs related to particular decisions and not to forecast the true scenario. Such reasoning means that 
usually the best and the worst state of nature vary depending on the decision considered (Gaspars-Wieloch, 2013b) – 
the scenario S1 may be the best for the alternative D1 and may be at the same time the worst for the alternative D2. 
Therefore, the approach presented below will be significantly different in order to avoid drawbacks of the 
original Hurwicz’s rule.   
We will assume that when β tends to 1, then the DM is an optimist and expects a very high income, close to the 
payoff characterized by the formula (9), i.e. M*. On the other hand, when β tends to 0, the decision maker is less 
demanding and wants to gain at least y*.   
Additionally, the parameter β will have an impact on the set of the most likely scenarios. One may make the 
following assumption – higher the value of this parameter is, less probable are, in the DM’s opinion, states of nature 
offering low payoffs. Therefore, such scenarios will not be considered in the optimization model.    
The optimization model corresponding to the new rule, called the β-decision rule for mixed strategies, may be 
formulated as follows: 
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where K denotes the set of the most probable events, rβ is the expected level of revenue dependent on β, gi is the 
deviation from rβ of the income achieved by the DM if the scenario Si occurs, n is the number of decisions, aij is the 
payoff connected with the state Si and the decision Dj, xj is the share of the alternative Dj in the mixed strategy. 
The constraint (20) shows the relationship between the coefficient of optimism and the expected revenue. Both 
sides of the condition (17) present the true revenue obtained if the shares for a particular mixed strategy equal x1, x2, 
…, xn and the scenario Si takes place. The aim (Equation 16) is to minimize, within the set K, the sum of all 
deviations between the true incomes and the expected ones. Notice that only positive deviations are treated as 
unwanted since then the expected revenue exceeds the true income. If the decision maker claims that a concrete 
event (let us say Si*) will take place, he or she may additionally introduce the constraint (21) which enables to set 
such values of the variables x1, x2, …, xn that guarantee that for this particular state of nature the true income will be 
not lower than the expected one. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that the event selected by the DM must 
obligatorily fulfill the first condition given in Equation (22). Otherwise, the problem is contradictory and does not 
have any feasible solution.   
One of the main question is how to select the most probable scenarios on the basis of the coefficient of optimism 
declared by the decision maker. Theoretically, there are many possible approaches (see e.g. Gaspars-Wieloch, 
2013b), but it is difficult to state which one indicates the most suitable set of events. Let us say that this set should 
contain all scenarios that satisfy the conditions (22)–(25): 
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where dij denotes the number of payoffs related to the alternative Dj which are worse than the payoff aij. The symbol 
m still signifies the number of scenarios and p(aij) is the position of the payoff aij in the non-increasing sequence of 
all profits connected with the decision Dj (when aij has the same value than other payoffs concerning a given 
alternative, then it is recommended to choose the farthest position of this payoff in the sequence – see Equation 25). 
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di is the total number of “dominance cases” related to the state Si, dmax and dmin are the highest and the lowest number 
of “dominance cases” respectively. A scenario Si may belong to K if and only if it contains at least one payoff not 
lower than rβ or its number of “dominance cases” is sufficiently close to dmax  (Equation 22). The scenario with dmax 
and with at least one payoff equal to M* might be treated as the best state of nature, but in many decision problems 
such an event does not exist.  
Hence, the β-decision rule for mixed strategies includes the following steps: 
• Step 1: Given a set of potential decisions and a payoffs’ matrix for the decision problem considered, choose an 
appropriate value of the parameter β according to your level of optimism. 
• Step 2: Solve the max-min problem in order to calculate the maximized minimum guaranteed income (y*), 
Equations (1)–(4). 
• Step 3: Find the maximum revenue (M*), Equation (9). 
• Step 4: Find the set of the most probable scenarios (K) with the aid of the Equations (22)–(25).   
• Step 5: Solve the β-decision problem using Equations (16)–(21) or (16)–(20) and additional constraints if 
necessary. The optimal solution represents the mixed strategy reflecting the level of optimism declared.  
4. Illustration 
Now let us analyze a simple decision problem. Assume that the decision maker wants to invest his capital in at 
least one out of 4 alternatives (D1, D2, D3, D4) giving an annual income dependent on the state of nature. Experts 
claim that there are 4 possible scenarios (S1, S2, S3, S4). The payoffs’ matrix is presented in Table 2. 
Each payoff aij represents the annual income (in mln Euro) provided that the decision maker allocates 100% of 
his capital in the investment Dj and that the scenario Si happens. Assume also that the income connected with the 
alternative Dj is directly proportional to the quantity of capital allocated in this decision. The decision maker intends 
to find an appropriate mixed strategy taking into account his level of optimism. 
Table 2. Payoffs’ matrix (case study) 
Scenarios and decisions D1 D2 D3 D4 
S1 5 7 6 7 
S2 3 5 2 10 
S3 8 3 1 3 
S4 9 9 11 2 
In order to solve this problem let us apply the β-decision rule for mixed strategies. 
• Step 1: Assume that β=0.6. 
• Step 2: The solution of the max-min problem for the case study is as follows: x1=0.5714, x2=0.0286, x3=0,  
x4=0.4, y*=5.857. So, in order to gain 5.86 mln Euro in one year (this is the maximized minimum guaranteed 
revenue), the DM ought to assign about 57% of his capital to the investment D1, almost 3% to the investment D2 
and 40% to the investment D4.  
• Step 3: The maximum revenue equals M*=11.  
• Step 4: All scenarios are Pareto-optimal, but according to the results presented below the state S3 does not belong 
to the set K. The expected income equals 9429.8857.5)857.511(6.0 =+−=βr . Thus the scenarios S2 and S4 are 
the only ones that contain at least one payoff not lower than 8.9429. On the other hand 6.63)39(6.0 =+−=βd . 
This means that the events S1 and S4 are the only ones which satisfy the second part of the condition (22), see 
Table 3. The scenarios S1, S2 and S4 fulfill at least one requirement. Therefore they form the set K.     
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Table 3. “Dominance cases” (case study) 
Scenarios and decisions D1 D2 D3 D4 di (dβ=6.6) 
S1 1 2 2 2 7 (ok.) 
S2 0 1 1 3 5  
S3 2 0 0 1 3   
S4 3 3 3 0 9 (ok.) 
• Step 5: Now one may formulate and solve the β-decision problem (assume that not a scenario is treated by the 
DM as completely sure):  
min}0,max{}0,max{}0,max{
421
→++ ggg   (26) 
14321
9429.87675 gxxxx −=+++   (27) 
24321
9429.810253 gxxxx −=+++  (28) 
44321
9429.821199 gxxxx −=+++  (29) 
1
4321
=+++ xxxx    (30) 
0,,,
4321
≥xxxx   (31) 
As one can see, we did not use the Equation (21) because the DM does not favour any state of nature. The 
solution is as follows: x1=0, x2=0.9918, x3=0, x4=0.0082, g1=1.9429, g2=3.9020, g3=5.9429 (this variable was not 
minimized!), g4=0. Both sides of the constraints (27)–(29) equal 7, 5.04, 8.94 respectively, which means that the 
most desirable events for our DM are S1 and S4 provided that he applies the mixed strategy recommended by the  
β-decision rule.  
We also remark that with such an investment structure the income connected with the scenario S3 amounts only 
to 3 mln Euro. It is a very low revenue, significantly lower than the minimum guaranteed revenue y*, but notice that 
the decision maker, whose coefficient of optimism is equal to 0.6, just does not expect the occurrence of such an 
unattractive state of nature – let us recall that its index d3 = dmin = 3. If the DM maintained that a particular scenario 
will happen, e.g. S2, than the β-decision rule would suggest solving an extended optimization problem with the 
constraint (32),  
0
2
≤g   (32) 
which leads to the following solution: x1=0, x2=0.2114, x3=0, x4=0.7886, g1=1.9429, g2=0, g3=5.9426 (this variable 
was not minimized!), g4=5.4629 (this variable was minimized, but it concerns the best state of nature which is 
especially vital for decision makers whose coefficient of optimism is equal to 1 or almost 1). Both sides of the 
constraints (27)–(29) equal 7, 8.94, 3.48 respectively.         
5. Conclusions 
The paper presents a new decision rule which may be applied for mixed strategy’s searching and which takes 
into account the decision maker’s coefficient of optimism (β). This parameter is used to evaluate the income 
expected by the DM and to suggest the most probable scenarios, i.e. the events which correspond most to the DM’s 
attitude. These secondary data enable to formulate and solve an optimization problem. The solutions obtained may 
facilitate the decision making process. 
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Notice that when the parameter β is equal to 0, then the set of the most probable states of nature (K) contains m 
elements (i.e. all scenarios) and the estimated expected income rβ is equal to the maximized minimum guaranteed 
revenue (y*), which means that in such circumstances the optimal mixed strategy generated by the β-decision rule is 
equivalent to the strategy recommended by the max-min model (i.e. the Wald’s rule for mixed strategies). Perhaps it 
is quite astonishing to include S4 in K when the DM is a pessimist (S4  is a very attractive scenario), but let us recall 
that when the decision maker has such attitude towards risk, that implies that he or she wants to be prepared for the 
future in the best way possible, i.e. he or she intends to gain at least y* regardless the event which will finally take 
place.     
The target of the new approach is to indicate a suitable mixed strategy provided that the decision maker intends 
to perform it only once. This assumption is quite significant, because one should be aware of the fact that after the 
realization of a mixed strategy, the decision maker may change his or her preferences, i.e. the level of optimism, and 
then a new optimization problem ought to be solved. 
In the paper the set K is formed on the basis of two criteria (the expected income rβ and the number of 
“dominance cases” dβ). Of course, this is only a suggestion – one may choose other indices. Here, we will just 
explain why it is recommended to consider both rβ and dβ, not merely the first criterion. When the maximum payoff 
M* is much higher than the remaining payoffs in the matrix, then, even for low values of β, the index rβ becomes so 
high that only the scenario offering M* meets the criterion rβ. This means that regardless the level of optimism, just 
one state of nature is treated as the most probable. 
Table 4. Payoffs’ matrix with a high value M* (case study) 
Scenarios and decisions D1 D2 D3 D4 di 
S1 4 2 4 1 6 
S2 3 3 1 4 7 
S3 2 4 1 3 6 
S4 1 1 100 1 3 
Let us analyze the example presented in Table 4. If we take into account only the expected income and the 
parameter β equals merely 0.02, the index rβ=0.02(100–2.975)+2.975=4.92. Hence, even if the DM was a radical 
pessimist (β=0.0106), the set K would contain only one element – the event S4. Therefore, it is recommended to 
apply an additional criterion, e.g. the number of “dominance cases”, which enables to keep also in this set all 
scenarios with an adequate index di. Thanks to the use of two criteria, for β<0.76 the set K={S1, S2, S3, S4} and for 
β≥0.76 the set K={S2, S4}. 
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